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Classical communications are used in the post-processing procedure of quantum key distribution.
Since the security of quantum key distribution is based on the principles of quantum mechanics,
intuitively the secret key can only be derived from the quantum states. We find that classical
communications are incorrectly used in the so-called quantum dialogue type protocols. In these
protocols, public communications are used to transmit secret messages. Our calculations show that
half of Alice’s and Bob’s secret message is leaked through classical channel. By applying Holevo
bound, we can see that the quantum efficiency claimed in the quantum dialogue type of protocols
is not achievable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an uncondition-
ally secure method by which a private key can be created
between two parties, Alice and Bob, who share a quan-
tum channel and a public authenticated classical chan-
nel. Since the pioneer QKD protocol was presented by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1], its security has been
studied intensively [2, 3, 4]. In BB84 protocol, Alice
randomly selects one of four states in two complemen-
tary bases to encode her secret message and Bob also
randomly selects one of the two bases to decode Alice’s
key bits. Consequently, basis reconciliation is necessary
in BB84 protocol. Recently, the quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC) protocols have been presented
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In the QSDC protocols, Bob can decode
Alice’s encoded message directly after his measurement
and they don’t need to do basis reconciliation. Based on
the idea of QSDC, a new type of quantum communica-
tion protocol, called quantum dialogue (QD), has been
presented [11, 12, 13, 14].
In the entanglement-based QD protocol [12], it is
claimed that both Alice and Bob can encode two-bit se-
cret message on an EPR pair. After a public announce-
ment, both Alice and Bob can obtain two-bit secret mes-
sage from each other. That is, Alice and Bob can encode
four-bit secret message in one EPR pair. Likewise, in
a single-photon QD protocol [13], both Alice and Bob
can encode one-bit secret message on a photon. So, both
Alice and Bob can obtain one-bit secret message from
each other. It is claimed that one qubit can be used to
transmit two-bit secret message [13], where the quantum
efficiency is four times than BB84.
In this paper, we prove that QD protocol presented
by [11, 12, 13, 14] are insecure because classical com-
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munication is erroneously used in these protocols. Alice
and Bob’s encoding operations are correlated given the
published measurement results. Our calculations show
that Eve can gain half information of Alice and Bob’s se-
cret message only by listening the classical channel. By
applying Holevo bound, we can see that the quantum effi-
ciency claimed in the quantum dialogue type of protocols
[11, 12, 13, 14] is not achievable.
II. REVIEW THE QUANTUM DIALOGUE
PROTOCOL
There are three types of QD protocols, quantum dense
key distribution using entanglement [11] which is the
prototype of quantum dialogue, QD protocol based on
EPR pairs [12] and QD protocol with single photon
sources [13]. Let us briefly review the idea of QD here
[12]. Alice first prepares an EPR pair in the singlet state
|Ψ−AB〉, where |Ψ
−
AB〉 =
1√
2
(|0A1B〉 − |1A0B〉). She keeps
one qubit A in her laboratory and sends the other qubit
B to Bob. After receiving qubit B, Bob may randomly
select message mode (MM) or control mode (CM). In
CM, Bob performs a local measurement on qubit B and
tells measurement results to Alice. After receiving Bob’s
announcement, Alice also switches to CM and measures
her qubit A. Alice and Bob can estimate the fidelity of
EPR pair after enough runs of CM. The QD transmis-
sion will be aborted if the fidelity of the EPR pair is
lower than some certain threshold. In MM, after receiv-
ing qubit B, Bob performs a unitary operation UB on
qubit B to encode his secret message and then sends it
back to Alice. After receiving the back qubit B, Alice
first performs a unitary operation UA on qubit A and
the state becomes |ΨAB〉 = U
AUB|Ψ−AB〉. Next, Alice
announces her measurement result |ΨAB〉 through the
classical channel. Since Alice knows her own encoding
operation UA and the measurement result |ΨAB〉, she
can exactly know Bob’s encoding operation UB to attain
2Bob’s encoded message. Likewise, Bob can obtain Alice’s
encoded message according to |ΨAB〉 and U
B. Conse-
quently, it seems as if both Alice and Bob can transmit
one-bit “secret” message to each other simultaneously so
that we call this protocol QD. In Ref.[12], both Alice and
Bob use four unitary operations σ00, σ01, σ10, σ11 to en-
code their secret message, 00, 01, 10, 11, respectively.
Consequently, both Alice and Bob can transmit two-bit
secret message to each other in each MM.
Likewise, in quantum dense key distribution protocol
[11], Alice first prepares one EPR pair in |Ψ−AB〉 and
sends one qubit to Bob. In MM, both Alice and Bob
encode one-bit secret message and then Alice announces
her measurement results through classical channel. In
this way, they can transmit one-bit secret message to
each other. Similarly, in the single photon QD protocol
[13], Alice first prepares a photon in one of four states
in two complementary bases and then both Alice and
Bob encode one-bit secret message on it. After Alice’s
announcement, both can obtain one-bit secret message
from each other.
III. HALF SECRET MESSAGE LEAKED
THROUGH PUBLIC CHANNEL
At the first glance, the QD protocol is secure since no
one except Alice and Bob knows Alice or Bob’s secret en-
coding operations to gain their secret message. However,
we will show in the following, anyone who can access Al-
ice and Bob’s classical channel can gain half information
about their secret message. Eve’s mean information gain
on Alice and Bob’s bits, I(AB : E), equals their relative
entropy decrease [17]:
I(AB : E) = Ha priori −Ha posteriori,
whereHa priori is the a priori entropy andHa postoriori is
the a postoriori entropy. In Ref.[12], the a priori entropy
Alice and Bob shared are 4 bits, that is, Ha priori = 4.
And the a posteriori entropy of Eve is averaged over
all possible results r. So she can get Ha posterior =∑
r P (r)H(i|r), where H(i|r) = −
∑
i P (i|r)log2[P (i|r)]
is the conditional information entropy. By listening the
classical channel, Eve can obtain Alice’s measurements
results |Ψ−AB〉, |Ψ
+
AB〉, |Φ
−
AB〉 and |Φ
+
AB〉, i.e., r = 4. Each
of the four measurement results corresponds to four of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s operations σAijσ
B
kl. The true value table
of their encoding operations is presented in Table I. And
the final state, |Ψ−AB〉, |Ψ
+
AB〉, |Φ
−
AB〉, or |Φ
+
AB〉, would
be published through classical channel. For instance, af-
ter Alice announces her measurement result |Ψ−AB〉, Eve
may have that P (σA00σ
B
00||Ψ
−
AB〉) = P (σ
A
01σ
B
01||Ψ
−
AB〉) =
P (σA10σ
B
10||Ψ
−
AB〉) = P (σ
A
11σ
B
11||Ψ
−
AB〉) =
1
4 (Here P (x|y)
is the probability of x conditioned on y, and we assume
that Alice and Bob’s operations are random). In this
case, Eve’s information about Alice and Bob’s secret mes-
sage is I(AB : E) = 2. That is, Eve can obtain half
TABLE I: True value table of Alice’s and Bob’s encoding op-
erations. |Ψ−AB〉, |Ψ
+
AB〉, |Φ
−
AB〉, |Φ
+
AB〉 are the final states of
their encoding operations σAijσ
B
kl on |Ψ
−
AB〉 and i, j, k, l ∈ 0,1.
|Ψ−AB〉 |Ψ
+
AB〉 |Φ
−
AB〉 |Φ
+
AB〉
σA00σ
B
00 σ
A
11σ
B
00 σ
A
01σ
B
00 σ
A
10σ
B
00
σA01σ
B
01 σ
A
10σ
B
01 σ
A
00σ
B
01 σ
A
11σ
B
01
σA10σ
B
10 σ
A
01σ
B
10 σ
A
11σ
B
10 σ
A
00σ
B
10
σA11σ
B
11 σ
A
00σ
B
11 σ
A
10σ
B
11 σ
A
01σ
B
11
information about Alice and Bob’s secret message only
by listening the classical cannel.
Likewise, Eve can gain one-bit secret information only
by listening the classical channel in the quantum dense
key distribution protocol [11]. In [13], Eve can also obtain
one-bit secret message by listening the classical channel.
Therefore, QD protocols are insecure even if Alice and
Bob hold a perfect quantum channel since half of secret
message would be leaked through the classical channel.
On the other hand, we will show in the following, the
quantum efficiency claimed in QD violates Holevo bound.
IV. VIOLATION OF HOLEVO BOUND
In QKD, a secret key is encoded in quantum states. So,
the maximal secret information that can be transmitted
in each run is completely determined by the quantum
channel capacity. The capacity of a quantum channel is
bounded by the Holevo bound. If information is encoded
on a state ρ, the accessible information of ρ is bounded
by the Holevo quantity [15]
χ(ρ) = S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi).
where ρ =
∑
i piρi. In quantum communication, the mu-
tual information I(A : B) between Alice and Bob should
be less than the Holevo bound [16], i.e., I(A : B) ≤
S(ρ) −
∑
i piS(ρi). In [12], the quantum channel capac-
ity is bounded by log2 4 = 2, i.e., at most two-bit se-
cret message can be encoded in each MM. As has been
discussed above, Alice and Bob encodes four bits secret
message in each MM, so that two-bit secret message will
be leaked through classical channel. In fact, Alice’s and
Bob’s encoding operations are correlated by the formula
σAijσ
B
kl|Ψ
−
AB〉 → |Ψ
AB
(i⊕j),(k⊕l)〉.
So, Eve can directly obtain the correlation between Al-
ice’s and Bob’s encoding operations after the announce-
ment of the final states. Let us assume that Alice
publishes her measurement result |Ψ−AB〉. As discussed
above, the possible operations of Alice’s and Bob’s are
σA00σ
B
00, σ
A
01σ
B
01, σ
A
10σ
B
10 and σ
A
11σ
B
11 (also see Table I)
and then Eve can obtain partial information of Alice and
Bob’s secret message.
3V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although QD is insecure, it can still be applied to QKD
as an approach to generate raw key. If Alice and Bob
have realized that half of their secret message has leaked
through classical channel, they can implement privacy
amplification to distill secure final key bits. Let us em-
phasize that quantum efficiency can truly be improved
by some other approaches. Note that the efficient BB84
has already been proposed and its unconditional security
proof has also been presented [18].
In summery, QD is insecure because of the erroneous
use of classical communication which reveals classical cor-
relations between Alice and Bob’s encoding operations.
The classical channel is public so that everyone including
Eve can access it to attain the correlations between Alice
and Bob’s encoding operations. Our calculations showed
that half of Alice and Bob’s secret message would be
leaked through classical channel in QD protocols. The
quantum efficiency claimed in QD violates the Holevo
bound.
We note that when this study was completed, we found
that the erroneous use of classical communication in QD
was independently pointed out by Gao et al. [19].
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